This paper traces the transition from planned command socialism to market capitalism and the accompanying complex non-linear dynamics involved. Long wave chaotic hysteretic investment cycles emerge under socialism leading to crisis and breakdown. Macroeconomic collapse occurs with bifurcations of coordination structures during transition. During recovery, transitional cobweb labor market dynamics exhibit chaos, fractal basin boundaries between coexisting non-chaotic attractors, discontinuous phase transitions, strange attractors, and cascades of infinitely many period-doubling bifurcations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The process of systemic economic transformation from planned command socialism to market capitalism has proven to be unpredictable and highly complicated with a variety of divergent paths and outcomes emerging from the breakup and collapse of the former Soviet-led CMEA bloc. Although social, political, and cultural factors played important roles in the actual collapse, an underlying factor and portent was the long economic stagnation that had become increasingly pronounced and which eventually led to a crisis atmosphere, especially in the USSR. This led to the reform efforts that would lead to actual economic decline and the breakup of the bloc and the broader collapse of the system.
The reform efforts, which spread in various ways and at various rates to the various countries in the bloc, and had already been going on for some time in China without any decline in economic activity, led to extremely sharp declines in economic activity among the CMEA members as the bloc broke up and in the aftermath of the breakup. This was the period of the most intense systemic transition when old economic institutions disintegrated and the effort began to install new ones in their place. In many countries this effort is still continuing and this stage of economic decline has not yet ended.
Corresponding author. Tel.: 540-568-3212. Fax: 540-568-3010. E-mail: rosserjb@jmu.edu. 1For an overview of alternative paths among the transitional economies, see Rosser and Rosser (1996a) , Murrell (1996) , Fischer et al. (1996) , and de Melo and Gelb (1996) . However, in others a turnaround has occurred and growth has resumed, albeit not always in an orderly or fully stable manner. This process of sharp decline followed by an upturn has been labeled the "J-curve" effect (Brada and King, 1992) . A few countries, most notably Poland and the Czech Republic, have recovered to the point that their per capita incomes have surpassed their pre-collapse levels. However, with a few exceptions, 2 most of these nations have experienced political and social upheavals during this process. In some cases this has led to sharp changes in economic policies with extreme instabilities and accompanying oscillations resulting therefrom. In all cases, even in the arguably highly successful case of China, the process of transition has been marked by notable discontinuities and turbulence of many kinds.
In this paper we seek to explicate to some degree the varieties of these episodes of discontinuity and turbulence by using some of the tools available in complex non-linear dynamics. We shall model both discontinuous changes as well as chaotic and other kinds of complex dynamics occurring during the course of these transitional processes. These will be hypothetical theoretical models which we find suggestive for explicating some of the phenomena that have been and are being observed within these economies. We shall not use any econometrics to test these conditional hypotheses. One reason for this is the shortness of the time period involved and thus the paucity of data compared to what is required to use the appropriate methods (Brock et al., 1991) . Nevertheless, an original aspect of this paper is its effort to theoretically model within the complex non-linear dynamics framework the entire process of transition from the emergence of crisis within the old command planned socialist economy through the collapse to the recovery and regeneration phase. (1994; 1995; 1997a) from a model of Puu (1990; to consider the development of the systemic crisis. Section III will examine the phenomenon of discontinuous collapse during the second phase as an example of coordination failure arising from institutional disintegration, drawing on models of Brock (1993) and Aghion and Blanchard (1994) as modified by Rosser and Rosser (1996b; 1997b) . Section IV carries the analysis forward to transitional dynamics within recovering economies where policy instabilities are associated with further complexities of dynamics, drawing on the previous models and work of Brock and Hommes (1997) as modified by Rosser and Rosser (1996c) . From these models a taxonomy of various transition paths can be discerned, hopefully with some connection to real events as discussed in the concluding section. (Kalecki, 1970; Goldmann, 1975) . Bauer (1978) (Rosser, 1991, Chap. 8; Rosser and Rosser, 1997a) . 3 These fluctuations remain disconnected from output fluctuations, the rate of growth of output gradually decelerating with technological stagnation and declining capital-output ratios. Our model (Rosser and Rosser, 1994; 1995) of these fluctuations is a modification of a model of Puu (1990; of the non-linear multiplieraccelerator model, originally due to Hicks (1950) and Goodwin (1951) , but reinterpreted as a long wave capital self-ordering model with a secondstage accelerator associated with investment in the investment sector itself (Forrester, 1977; Sterman, 1985; Sterman and Mosekilde, 1996) .
II. THE CRISIS OF THE
Let investment be allocated between the consumption and investment sectors, with IC being investment in the consumption sector and II being investment in the investment sector. Then It ICt +IIt.
(1) Investment in the consumption sector is given by a relationship that resembles the traditional consumption multiplier in the usual multiplieraccelerator model of output, being
Investment in the investment goods sector is given by a relationship that resembles the accelerator part of a non-linear multiplier-accelerator model of output, but with a cubic formulation proposed by Puu (1990; , justified by him on the basis of countercyclical government investment policies. 
The behavior of I as a function of z can now be examined according to variations of the parameters, v and u. Puu (1990; has done so for an equivalent model of output and finds that as v approaches zero, the amplitude and period of the cycle lengthen and can take on a long wave interpretation. As u increases from 1.5 to 2, period-doubling bifurcations occur with chaotic dynamics emerging for u > 2 within the larger cycle. For u _> 2, as v increases, the period and Closely related to the concept of a technique cluster is that of a "techno-infrastructure" (Day and Walter, 1989) . It is possible to view the systemic collapse as a decline from one such techno-infrastructure, or technique cluster, to a lower one, although this can easily be questioned.
4In the original formulations of Hicks (1950) and Goodwin (1951) there were simply floors and ceilings to investment, rather than the "backward bends" implied by a cubic formulation. Samuelson (1939) had earlier posed the possibility of non-linearity in his multiplier-accelerator model, but posited it as arising from the consumption function rather than the investment accelerator.
amplitude of the long wave cycle decline and the chaotic dynamics come to fully dominate. Figure 1 , drawn from Puu (1990; represents an intermediate case, with v very small and u 2. Thus there is a long wave oscillation with chaotic dynamics occurring within the cycle at the jumps from one branch to another. We note that the chaotic dynamics appear after the jumps and that there then follow period-halving bifurcations as the system transits out of chaotic dynamics to simple behavior. Such a pattern of jumps between distinct branches with chaos occurring with the jumps can be called "chaotic hysteresis" (Rosser, 1991, Chap. 17; Rosser and Rosser, 1995 Rosser (1993a,b) . 6Among those emphasizing the role of institutional collapse on information transmission and the formation of appropriate incentive structures within the nascent market economies include Murrell (1991), Ellman (1994) , Kornai (1994) , Stiglitz (1994) , and Yavlinsky and Braguinsky (1994) . Those emphasizing the role of the non-functioning of credit institutions include Calvo and Corricelli (1992) , Uhlig (1993) , and Melitz and Waysand (1994 Here we follow Rosser and Rosser (1996b; 1997b) in modeling the decline of output after the initial shock to exports as a problem of coordination failure. This takes place within a transitional labor market model due to Aghion and Blanchard (1994 
State sector layoffs equal s, a policy variable, and we assume that there is no rehiring in that sector. Private sector job formation is given by dN/dt a( y-z-w),
with the value of a being a function of the institutional framework of the economy and its resulting ability to coordinate signals, along with legal, property, financial, and regulatory institutions. Let H equal the number of private sector hires coming strictly from the unemployed, r be the interest rate, c be a constant difference between the "value of being (privately) employed," V(N), and the "value of being unemployed," V(U), this latter determined by an efficiency wage outcome. This gives private sector wages as
with the values of V(N) and V(U) given by arbitrage equations:
Total unemployment benefits, Ub, are given by
The above imply a reduced form of private sector job formation given by
The dynamics of this represented by this equation are depicted in Fig. 2 Alternative approaches to coordination failure are discussed in Guesnerie (1993) and Colander (1996) . The height of f(U) in Fig. 2 Assuming that direct net profitability per firm of hiring a worker is given by (y-z-w), not accounting for interfirm externalities, then the net addition of jobs per firm is 
If there is an equal rate of interaction between firms, then rn characterizes the set of k's and if the choice set is restricted to (/1,-1), then Brock (1993, pp. 22-23) shows that:
where tanh is the hyperbolic tangent. /3J is a bifurcation parameter with a critical value equal to 1, 8F is assumed to be constant, possible if we allow "potential" firms to have zero output.
See Guesnerie (1993) and Colander (1996) for more general discussions of the role of signal coordination.
1In the original IPS literature /is "temperature" (Kac, 1968) Fig. 3 of a macroeconomic collapse. There is more than one possible scenario here within this story. Thus, it could be argued for some cases that the command planned system was in the upper right branch of Fig. 4 initially, reflecting a high degree of coordination within the system. As the degree of coordination declined with the end of planning the system moved to the branch to the left. Or alternatively it could be argued that it began on that branch, and then moved to the right with an increase in the intensity of choice of emerging private firms, but in the face of a lack of institutional support they become pessimistic and drop to the lower right branch in Fig. 4 . Yet a third scenario could be that just described but where the firms become optimistic and jump to the upper right branch. This scenario, implying a discontinuous upward leap in the growth rate, might explain the Chinese case. 
IV. TRANSITIONAL UPSWING COMPLEXITIES
An increasing number of transitional economies appear to be getting beyond the kinds of collapse scenarios depicted in the previous section and are experiencing growth in conjunction with a process of privatization or restructuring of suddenly privatized firms, as the new institutional framework takes shape. Nevertheless, this process has seen numerous political backlashes as the numerous losers in the process react against what is happening. 12 The upshot has been considerable political instability and churning in many countries, including some such as Poland that have been among the most successful according to standard growth statistics, and even in the most successful of all such economies, China (Zou, 1991 
1 Such a contrast between self-fulfilling optimistic and pessimistic scenarios within privatizing transition economies has been studied using game theory by Laban and Wolf (1994) .
12 One prominent phenomenon in many of the growing transitional economies that has proven very disruptive has been the widespread outbreak of speculative bubbles that then collapse in many of the nascent financial markets (Tamborski, 1995 (Ezekiel, 1938 ).
13 This model will differ from a more standard labor market model in that the quantity axis will be in rates of change rather than in levels. 14 We adopt the approach of Brock and Hommes (1997) 
ARED is given by Eq. (24) and
13 Chiarella (1988) shows that even monotonic supply and demand curve models can behave chaotically if there are sufficiently long lags. See Hommes (1991; for further discussion of chaotic cobweb models.
14peter Flaschel has noted to us that this means that this is essentially a disequilibrium or temporary equilibrium model. We emphasize that this formulation is only relevant during a transition process and that a more standard equilibrium formulation becomes more relevant once the transition ends.
15A similar approach of conflicting predictors leading to complex dynamics can be found in Grandmont (1994) , Sorger (1994) , and Palmer et al. (1994) . Such systems can underlie "chaotic bubbles" as seen in Day and Huang (1990) .
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which possesses a unique steady state at S (w*, m*) (0, tanh(-BC/2)).
If C--0 then H1 always dominates and the steady state will be stable at (0, 0). If C > 0 there will exist a B* at which period-doubling bifurcation will occur with the two period cycle given by (w , m^) (-w , m^), (27) m^= -a/k,
with w given by the unique solution to (1997) show that as B increases from 1.36 to 1.37 the basin boundary between these coexisting attractors appears to become fractal, implying erratic dynamics even without any appearance of other forms of complex dynamics. 16 The ARED given by (24) and (25) Although the unstable manifold becomes arbitrarily close to the stable segment w=0 as B increases, no transversal homoclinic intersection occurs because for rn < 1, w changes sign each succeeding period thereby preventing a jump onto the w--= 0 segment. Such a transversal homoclinic intersection between stable and unstable manifolds would be sufficient for the existence of a full horseshoe with an invariant Cantor set near the homoclinic orbit that contains infinitely many periodic orbits and an uncountable set of chaotic orbits, indeed an infinite set of such horseshoes (Smale, 1965; 1967) . Palis and Takens (1993, Appendix Also, Brock and Hommes (1997) show that one can place a rectangle over certain zones of the unstable manifold in which there is a mapping over 16See McDonald et al. (1985) for a discussion of such phenomena. Lorenz (1992; has shown such cases for Kaldor-style business cycle models. See Feldpausch (1997) (Benedicks and Carleson, 1991; Mora and Viana, 1993) , the coexistence of infinitely many stable cycles for a residual set of B's (the "Newhouse phenomenon") (Newhouse, 1974) , and (Portes, 1994) . And the arguably most successful of all transitional economies, the world's most rapidly growing one of China, has been notable for the gradualism of its approach which has not put it at the far end of the liberalization index.
Indeed, what is more striking is the considerable diversity of outcomes and paths that we can observe. Certainly there was much diversity before the process began, with China differing in many ways from the European CMEA nations, and them varying from more strongly centrally controlled economies such as the Czech Republic to relatively market-oriented Hungary. But the observable differences between the economic performances among these nations far outweigh any other inter-country variations in recent years, from the Chinese supergrowth to nations with sharply declining output, with inflation rates ranging from single digits to the thousands of percents per year (Fischer et al., 1996) , from nations such as Hungary and the Czech Republic whose income distributions remain the most equal in Europe to Russia whose income distribution has become the most unequal in the industrialized world (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997) . This paper has sought to provide some reasons why we might observe such sharply divergent outcomes from a broadly similar process of transition. We see how, beneath of surface calm of macroeconomic stability, a deeper crisis built up in the capital goods sector of the planned command socialist economies as a pattern of chaotic hysteresis. With the ending of the former system and the ending of its institutional framework in the context of a collapse of international trade, we see that these economies faced sharply divergent scenarios of transition depending on signal coordination and the decision making of newly forming firms that could lead to successful and even rapid growth or to deep implosion and depression as critical phase transitions are passed. Finally, we see that even in the case of a growing transitional economy policy oscillations can occur that can take on a variety of highly complex patterns.
All of this suggests that a degree of caution is in order for presumptuously prescribing international authorities. Those nations that have desperately attempted to avoid any changes in the circumstance of a collapsed international system have experienced severe economic difficulties.
But, it is also clear that in the face of extreme political and economic instability and turbulence, a healthy concern for maintaining certain stabilizing elements within the process of transition seems very reasonable. Indeed, this is exactly what the most successful of these transitional economies have done.
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